Interactive demo

Before using this, read what a TEE is and how it works if you haven’t — this demo computes the cryptographic half of remote attestation for real. It does not, and physically cannot, compute the actual hardware memory isolation a TEE relies on — that part is shown below as a labeled illustration, not a computation.

The real demo: attestation verification

1. Publish expected measurement — hash whatever is currently in the code box. This represents a verifier who reviewed and approved this exact code in advance.
2. Generate & publish quote — hash the code box again (edit it first, if you want) and sign that measurement with the manufacturer key. This represents the enclave producing evidence of what it’s running.
3. Verify — check the quote’s signature and that its measurement matches what was published in step 1.
4. Then try the two dedicated buttons below the demo panel, each demonstrating a different way tampering gets caught: reusing an old signature over new code (the signature check fails), and honestly re-signing tampered code (the signature is valid, but the measurement no longer matches what the verifier expected — rejected anyway).

Every value above is computed live in your browser using @noble/curves (Ed25519) and @noble/hashes (SHA-256) — see Code for the same scheme in Python, JavaScript, and Rust.

The illustration: what real hardware does for isolation

This part is not computed — it can’t be, in a browser. It’s a sketch of what happens on real hardware when an enclave is created and used, so the “physically cannot be computed in JavaScript” claim on how it works doesn’t have to stay abstract.